12 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
1507 | We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Although it is impossible to make contact in a finite time with things that are infinite in quantity, it is possible to do so with things that are infinitely divisible, since the time itself is also infinite in this way. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A25) by Aristotle - Physics 233a21 |
5109 | The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Zeno's so-called 'Achilles' claims that the slowest runner will never be caught by the fastest runner, because the one behind has first to reach the point from which the one in front started, and so the slower one is bound always to be in front. | |
From: report of Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 239b14 | |
A reaction: The point is that the slower runner will always have moved on when the faster runner catches up with the starting point. We must understand how humble the early Greeks felt when they confronted arguments like this. It was like a divine revelation. |
1512 | Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Zeno is wrong in arguing that the tiniest fragment of millet makes a sound; there is no reason why the fragment should be able to move in any amount of time the air which the whole bushel moved as it fell. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A29) by Aristotle - Physics 250a16 |
1508 | Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Zeno's third argument claims that a moving arrow is still. Here the conclusion depends on assuming that time is composed of nows; if this assumption is not granted, the argument fails. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A27?) by Aristotle - Physics 239b5 |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It should not be said that as distinct words and intentions or concepts are distinct from one another, so too the corresponding things are distinct. Those distinctions do not always line up with distinctions among things that are signified. | |
From: William of Ockham (Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents [1320], 7.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the great nominalist opponent of the idea that Aristotle's ten categories give an accurate map of reality. He proposed just substance and accidents, and based categorisation on the questions we ask. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
454 | If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: It things are many, they can't be more or less than they are, so they must be finite, but also there must be endless things between each thing, so they must be infinite. | |
From: Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B3), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 140.29 |
455 | That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not. | |
From: Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
1511 | If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius] |
Full Idea: If there is a place it will be in something, because everything that exists is in something. But what is in something is in a place. Therefore the place will be in a place, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, there is no such thing as place. | |
From: report of Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B3) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.562.3 |