Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Matter and Memory', 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?st2=Wilfrid Sellars' and 'Postscripts on supervenience'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
     Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
     Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference.