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Ideas for 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)', 'Second Commentary on 'Isagoge'' and 'Philosophy of Mind'

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2 ideas

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
     Full Idea: Although your heart is a material object, the property of being a heart is, if we accept the functionalist picture, not a material property.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Presumably functional properties are not physical because they are multiply realisable. The property of being a heart is more like a theoretical flow diagram than it is like a muscle. That word 'property' again…
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
     Full Idea: If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: The problem is not that qualia must be denied, but that there is strong pressure to class them as epiphenomena. However, a raw colour can have a causal role (e.g. in an art gallery). Best to say (with Chalmers?) that functions cause qualia?