20 ideas
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
8942 | Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |