16 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |