19 ideas
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |