Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Plural Quantification', 'Supervenience' and 'There Are No Abstract Objects'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
10633 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10638 A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10635 Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
10636 Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
10639 Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
10640 Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
10641 Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
16039 Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
16043 Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16047 Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16040 Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
16044 Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
16046 Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16049 Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10643 We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
10637 Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
14596 Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16042 The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14598 Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10634 Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]