Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Definition of Good', 'A Priori Knowledge' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 5: Abstraction'

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13 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]