9 ideas
| 8616 | How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin] |
| 8617 | Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 8618 | Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |