10 ideas
| 14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
| 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
| 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
| 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
| 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
| 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
| 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |