17 ideas
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |