14 ideas
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |