40 ideas
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |