Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'True in Theory, but not in Practice' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]