9 ideas
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |