20 ideas
| 23881 | All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil] |
| 23885 | Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil] |
| 23886 | Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 23884 | Truth is a value of thought [Weil] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 23882 | Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil] |
| 23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |