8 ideas
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
| 9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
| 9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
| 9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |