15 ideas
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
| 14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
| 14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |