Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Definition of Good', 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15118 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
15116 Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
15111 In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
15115 In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15117 Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15114 Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
18671 The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]