Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Definition of Good', 'Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division' and 'Metaphysics: an introduction'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki]
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]