15 ideas
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |