14 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |