Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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12 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]