Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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28 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]