12 ideas
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |