13 ideas
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |