Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'The Journals of Kierkegaard' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
16000 Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
16012 Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
16003 If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
21910 Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
16001 Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
16008 The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
20735 We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]