Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Maxims and Reflections' and 'Value Theory'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Many people imagine that to experience is to understand [Goethe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is [Goethe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Beauty is a manifestation of secret natural laws [Goethe]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The happiest people link the beginning and end of life [Goethe]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The best form of government teaches us to govern ourselves [Goethe]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
To get duties from people without rights, you must pay them well [Goethe]