19 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
168 | To understand morality requires a soul [Plato] |