Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Logical Atomism' and 'Externalism/Internalism'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6118 Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
6116 A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6117 Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110 Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6107 It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6115 Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
6109 Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6108 Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
10968 Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
6113 To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
6114 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
21722 Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6111 As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]