Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' and 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)'

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9 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]