Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Logical Atomism' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6118 Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
6116 A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6117 Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110 Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6107 It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6115 Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
6109 Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6108 Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
23634 Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
10968 Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
6113 To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
6114 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
21722 Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6111 As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
23635 Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7631 Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
23637 Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
23638 Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
23639 It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
6492 Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
23641 People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
23642 If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23640 Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]