8 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |