8 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |