Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Brainchildren' and 'A Powers Theory of Modality'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
12463 Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14375 If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
14378 Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12467 Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
14377 Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14376 States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14372 Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12466 All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
14371 We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2526 Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12465 Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12464 If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
12469 Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
2525 Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2524 A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
2529 Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]