Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
2516 Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
2510 Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
2521 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
2513 We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
2522 Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
2518 Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]