23 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |