Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Finkish dispositions' and 'Persistence, Change and Explanation'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]