Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Elements of Geometry' and ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]