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All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)' and 'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects'

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63 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]