18 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |