Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts' and 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]