Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Tropes' and 'Letters to Foucher'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

13 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
10466 Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
2117 The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]