Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Central Questions of Philosophy', 'Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]