Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'The Question of Realism' and 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10482 The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10492 A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
10485 Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10484 The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
10491 Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
10483 Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10490 Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10488 It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10487 I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10489 We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]