Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Maxims' and 'In Defense of Essentialism'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]