Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'The Art of the Infinite' and 'De Re and De Dicto'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
15717 Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
15712 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
15711 The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
15714 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15715 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
15713 The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]