Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Concept of a Person', 'Propositions' and 'Introduction to 'Causation''

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
8329 Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8324 The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8328 Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
8327 If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8330 Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8325 The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]