58 ideas
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |