12 ideas
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |